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 Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods Experiments:
 How Much and Why?
 By THOMAS R. PALFREY AND JEFFREY E. PRISBREY *
 We report the results of voluntary contributions experiments where subjects are
 randomly assigned different rates of returnfrom their private consumption. These
 random assignments are changed round to round, enabling the measurement of
 individual player contribution rates as a function of that player's investment cost.
 We directly test these response functions for the presence of warm-glow and/or
 altruism effects. We find significant evidence for heterogeneous warm-glow ef-
 fects that are, on average, low in magnitude. We statistically reject the presence
 of an altruism effect. (JEL C92, C92, H41)
 There is a growing body of experimental
 data from voluntary contribution, public goods
 environments with a single public good and a
 single private good. Among the many features
 of the data that are difficult to explain is the
 apparent frequent use of strictly dominated
 strategies. Subjects not only give away money
 when free-riding is a dominant strategy (R.
 Mark Isaac et al. [1984, 1994], Isaac and
 James M. Walker [1988, 1989], and else-
 where), but they also often fail to contribute
 when it is in their own best interests to do so
 (Tatsuyoshi Saijo and Hideki Nakamura,
 1995). Furthermore, individual behavior over
 time exhibits erratic patterns, with many sub-
 jects alternating back and forth between gen-
 erosity and selfishness. John 0. Ledyard's
 (1995) excellent survey documents these and
 several other anomalies.
 The anomalies might be cause for a serious
 reexamination of the theory, as they signal
 trouble for current economic models of selfish
 behavior. However, the range of environments
 for which these experimental results have been
 reported is very narrow, and more importantly
 the designs employed make it difficult, if not
 impossible, to estimate the actual strategies
 underlying subject behavior. Our design, by
 changing both the information structure and
 the distribution of preferences, allows the es-
 timation of strategies at both the group and the
 individual level. As a result, we are able to
 clearly identify the different sources of some
 of these anomalies. The different environment
 also provides a chance to see if previous anom-
 alous findings are robust.
 We employed the following basic design,
 which is a variation on the Voluntary Contri-
 butions Mechanism (Isaac et al., 1984). Each
 subject was given an endowment which could
 voluntarily be contributed toward a public
 good, or kept to be consumed as a private good.
 The consumption value of the public good de-
 pended linearly upon the total contributions of
 the group. All the subjects in a group had the
 same commonly known, marginal value for the
 public good. But, individual subjects were ran-
 domly assigned different marginal values for
 the private good from a commonly known dis-
 tribution. In such a setup, subjects whose value
 for the private good is less than their value for
 the public good have a dominant strategy to
 contribute all of their endowment; subjects
 whose value for the private good is greater than
 their value for the public good have a dominant
 strategy to keep all of their endowment or to
 free ride. Subjects repeated the game several
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 times, each time being randomly reassigned a
 new value for the private good.
 Specifically, our laboratory environment
 consists of N individuals, each endowed with
 wi discrete units of a private good. The mar-
 ginal rate of transformation between the public
 good and the private good is one-for-one, and
 individual monetary payoff functions are of
 the form: U(xi, x-i) = Vlj xj + ri (wi - xi),
 where xi is the individual's contribution. We
 refer to V as the marginal value of the public
 good, and it is the same for all individuals. The
 marginal value of the private good is ri, and it
 is private information.
 Essentially all of what we think we know
 about behavior in this game is based on ex-
 periments in which the marginal valuations of
 the private good are identical in all periods for
 all participants in the experiments. With one
 exception,' the private good valuations exceed
 the public good valuation, so all subjects have
 a dominant strategy to free ride. The central
 findings from these experiments are summa-
 rized below.
 * Most players in this game violate their
 one-shot dominant strategy, with many con-
 tributing upwards of half their endowment.
 They do so even when the marginal valuation
 of the private good is three or more times that
 of the public good.
 * As the marginal valuation of the private
 good gets closer to the marginal valuation of
 the public good, more violations of the domi-
 nant strategy are observed.
 * Subjects can be roughly categorized ac-
 cording to their tendency to violate the domi-
 nant strategy.
 * Violations of dominant strategies dimin-
 ish both with repetition and with experience
 (playing a second sequence of games with a
 new group).
 * Violations of dominant strategies to con-
 tribute, i.e., when ri < V, appear to be as prev-
 alent as violations of dominant strategies to
 free ride (Saijo and Nakamura, 1995).
 Several possible explanations have been of-
 fered for why there is so much more cooper-
 ation than the standard theory predicts. The
 explanations that have thus far received the
 most attention are:
 (a) altruistic preferences;
 (b) warm-glow preferences;
 (c) repeated game effects, including repu-
 tation building; and
 (d) subject confusion.
 The first two explanations are similar be-
 cause they both suggest that subjects have a
 nonmonetary component in their utility func-
 tion that is difficult for the experimenter to
 control, and that works in the opposite direc-
 tion of the monetary incentive to free ride. By
 altruistic preferences we mean that a subject's
 utility is increasing, not only in his or her own
 payoff, but also in the total group payoff.
 Warm-glow preferences mean that the act of
 contributing, independent of how much it in-
 creases group payoffs, increases a subject's
 utility by a fixed amount.
 At first blush, these two effects would ap-
 pear to be the same, but in fact they are not.
 Unlike the warm-glow explanation, the altru-
 ism explanation predicts that increases in
 group size and/or in the value of the public
 good should have very large effects on contri-
 bution rates. The warm-glow explanation does
 not depend upon group size or the marginal
 value of the public good.
 The latter two explanations, (c) and (d), are
 suggested by the tendency for contributions to
 decline with repetition and with experience.
 The declines may be consistent with learning
 or endgame effects.
 It is possible that the typical act of contri-
 bution is motivated, perhaps to differing de-
 grees, by each of these explanations. One
 purpose of these experiments is to accurately
 measure subject behavior in order to cleanly
 separate between these explanations and as-
 certain their relative importance. To do so re-
 quires major design innovations relative to the
 standard public goods experiment. In the typ-
 ical past experiments, all subjects within a
 group had the same ri; here different subjects
 have different ri's.' In the past, all subjects
 'Saijo and Nakamura (1995).
 2 There are a few exceptions, notably Isaac et al. ( 1985 )
 and Joseph R. Fisher et al. (1995), both of whom consider
 environments with two incentive types. The latter provides
 subjects with identical information about other subjects'
 preferences as in parallel homogeneous preference exper-
 iments. The former has several other different features,
 including nonlinearities, and does not conduct any base-
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 usually had a dominant strategy to free ride,
 while here the subjects sometimes have a dom-
 inant strategy to contribute. In the past, sub-
 jects repeated the decision with the same
 incentives each period; here the subject's in-
 centives change each period.
 In earlier experiments, a subject who con-
 tributed because of confusion or decision error
 could not be differentiated from a subject who
 contributed because of altruism or warm glow.
 Because ri was always bigger than V, subjects
 never had an incentive to contribute, and there-
 fore every contribution could be called a de-
 cision error. Behavior motivated by altruism
 or a warm glow, although potentially ob-
 served, could not be separately identified. Fur-
 thermore, it was impossible even to observe
 noncontribution when ri < V.
 Thus there is an inherent limitation in past
 designs. In our design this problem is elimi-
 nated and contribution arising from confusion
 or decision error can be differentiated from
 contribution due to nonmonetary components
 of the utility function.
 Thus, a key benefit of our design is that the
 resulting data allows the accurate and unbiased
 measurement of strategies - measurement
 that controls for the possibility of subject error.
 And, directly from the estimated strategies
 come estimates of the amount of altruism and
 warm glow in the individual utility functions.
 We can also check for the robustness of exist-
 ing results to environments that include im-
 portant features, such as diverse preferences
 and incomplete information, that are endemic
 to natural settings.
 I. Experimental Design and Procedures
 There are specific features of our design that
 enable us to address issues that are relevant to
 understanding other commonly observed pat-
 tems of behavior as well. These features are
 listed below. A sample copy of the instructions
 is in the Appendix.
 1. Each subject participates in four se-
 quences of ten periods (one decision per pe-
 riod), each ten-period sequence with a
 different group of three other subjects.3 The
 first two such sequences have the same value
 of V. The last two sequences also have the
 same value of V, but different from the value
 in the first two sequences. This allows us to
 identify experience effects. The first sequence
 with each value of V is coded as inexperi-
 enced, and the second sequence as experi-
 enced.4 All four sequences occur in a single
 session that lasts approximately 90 minutes.
 Each session includes 16 subjects.
 2. In all our environments, subjects receive
 ri's that are randomly assigned according to a
 uniform distribution between 1 and 20 in unit
 increments. We sometimes refer to these as to-
 ken values. Each time a subject is to make a new
 decision, he or she is independently and ran-
 domly assigned a new r, for that decision. Sub-
 jects do not know the other subjects'
 assignments of rj's, but the distribution is pub-
 licly announced at the beginning of the experi-
 ment. The value of Vis also publicly announced.
 Therefore, the data contain multiple obser-
 vations of the choice behavior of each individ-
 ual at different values of ri, and permit the
 estimation of response functions at both the
 individual and aggregate levels.
 3. We vary the value of the public good, V,
 between experiments. We have an equal num-
 ber of observations for each of the four differ-
 ent values of V e { 3, 6, 10, 15 } (see Table
 1). One value, V = 3, has the feature that
 group efficiency is not maximized when all
 subjects contribute in every decision period. In
 that condition, on average, 40 percent of the
 time subjects are assigned a token value that
 is worth more than four times the individual
 line experiments with homogeneous preferences. Gerald
 Marwell and Ruth E. Ames (1980) and D. S. Brookshire
 et al. (1989) have also conducted experiments with het-
 erogeneous preferences, but these are not comparable for
 other reasons. None of these experiments varied individual
 incentives across decisions, nor did they provide explicit
 information about the distribution of incentives in the pop-
 ulation. Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal ( 1991 ) use an en-
 vironment similar to the one explored here, but the public
 good technology is step-level, not linear.
 'Fixing the groups for a sequence of ten periods was
 done to maintain comparability with past experiments. We
 also conducted a replication of one of the Isaac et al.
 ( 1984) treatments, using our instructions, computer pro-
 tocol, and subject pool. We obtained results, reported in
 Palfrey and Prisbrey ( 1993 ), that were similar to Isaac et
 al. (1984).
 4 Alternative ways of coding experience produce sim-
 ilar results.
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 TABLE 1-SESSION NUMBER AND SEQUENCE NUMBERS
 FOR EACH OF THE EIGHT TREATMENTS
 V
 Endowment 3 6 10 15
 1 token Session# 1 3 1 3
 Sequence#'s 1,2 1,2 3,4 3,4
 9 tokens Session # 2 4 4 2
 Sequence#'s 1,2 1,2 3, 4 3, 4
 Notes: The experiment consisted of four sessions, each with four ten-period sequences.
 This table indicates session number and sequence numbers for each of the eight treatments.
 marginal value of the public good. In these
 cases, contribution reduces group efficiency.
 4. We vary the endowment. In one condi-
 tion, everyone is endowed with one indivisible
 unit of the private good. In the other condition,
 everyone is endowed with nine discrete units,
 and can contribute any number between zero
 and nine in each period (see Table 1).
 5. All sessions were conducted at the Caltech
 Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Po-
 litical Science, using a collection of computers
 that are linked together in a network.
 6. Each subject was paid cash for each
 point he or she earned in the session. On av-
 erage, each individual subject earned approx-
 imately $15 in a session.
 II. Data Analysis
 We focus mainly on two aspects of the data.
 The first has to do with attempting to identify
 what we call errors or background noise-
 behavior that is grossly inconsistent with stan-
 dard theory. Second, we attempt to measure
 response functions, the analog to bidding func-
 tions in auctions. The response functions ad-
 dress the question: How do contribution
 decisions depend on the private token values
 and the public good value, and how do these
 functions change with our treatment variables,
 such as experience? We estimate response
 functions at both the aggregate and individual
 levels, using probit models.
 One can interpret our analysis in the context
 of a random utility model, of the sort found in
 Daniel McFadden (1982), G. S. Maddala
 ( 1983), and elsewhere, for the analysis of data
 with limited dependent variables. For exam-
 ple, in the treatment where subjects have a sin-
 gle indivisible unit of the private good, they
 face a simple binary decision. We then model
 the statistical structure by assuming that utility
 functions have both uncontrolled fixed com-
 ponents (other than the monetary payoff) that
 we estimate, and an independent Normally
 distributed random component. Consistent
 with terminology elsewhere, we call the fixed
 components the altruism and warm-glow ef-
 fects, which we differentiate below.
 The altruism effect measures the additional
 utility a subject gains from increasing the mon-
 etary payoff to other subjects by one unit
 (Ledyard, 1995). Formally, an altruist's utility
 is modeled as a convex combination of the
 group payoff and his private payoff. The warm-
 glow effect measures the additional utility a
 subject gains from just the act of contributing
 a unit of his endowment (James Andreoni,
 1988). Altruistic behavior is present in our data
 if contributions increase with the public good
 value, other factors held constant. Warm-glow
 effects are present if contributions increase with
 an increase in the difference between the public
 good value and the token value, other factors
 held constant. Because we separately vary both
 the token values for individuals and the public
 good values, we can identify the effects on con-
 tribution rates of these two components of the
 utility function. This is described in detail in
 Section II, subsection C.
 A. Some Baselines
 We first present three different baseline er-
 ror rates. This gives a rough calibration of a
 lower bound on the amount of noise in the
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.115 on Mon, 07 Mar 2016 21:41:42 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 VOL. 87 NO. 5 PALFREY AND PRISBREY: PUBLIC GOODS EXPERIMENTS 833
 TABLE 2-THE FREQUENCY OF SPLIrTING WHEN THE
 ENDOWMENT Is NINE AND DIFF > 0.
 Early Late
 Inexperienced 0.36 0.19
 (182) (176)
 Experienced 0.21 0.07
 (180) (170)
 experiment. By noise, we mean the percent of
 observed decisions that appear incongruous
 with nearly any currently accepted theory
 of rational decision-making. We also com-
 pare our baseline with baselines observed
 elsewhere.
 Splitting. By splitting, we mean that a subject
 contributes some fraction of his or her endow-
 ment, but not all of it. This is only a possibility
 in half of our data, the data where subjects
 have a divisible endowment. Because of the
 linear structure of the environment, such be-
 havior is not rational even if a subject is altru-
 istic or experiences an additive warm-glow
 effect. A subject who plays optimally in this
 environment will always contribute either all
 or none of his or her endowment, the choice
 depending on ri - V.5
 Table 2 shows the frequency of splitting in
 the experiments where subjects could split.
 One can see two striking features: first, split-
 ting is more prominent among inexperienced
 subjects and in the early periods of each ten-
 period game; second, splitting almost never
 occurs when subjects have ri - V < 0. Most
 splitting can be accounted for by inexperi-
 enced subjects who have a dominant strategy
 to free ride.6
 These findings contrast somewhat with
 those of Isaac et al. ( 1984), who observe split-
 ting in well over half the decisions in their
 data. Furthermore, in some of their experi-
 ments the frequency of splitting does not de-
 cline over the course of the ten periods. (See
 Palfrey and Prisbrey [1993 ] for details.)
 Spite. If cooperative behavior (altruism,
 warm glow, or reputation building) is the main
 driving force behind the past findings of over-
 contribution, then we should not observe free-
 riding from subjects with ri - V < 0. To the
 extent that violations of dominant strategies to
 contribute are observed, they might be attrib-
 uted to effectively random behavior.7 This
 gives us a second kind of baseline, called spite
 (Saijo and Nakamura, 1995). In our experi-
 ments, 4 percent of the decisions violate the
 dominant strategy to contribute when ri -
 V < 0. This number is quite stable across
 periods and across the experience treatment.
 Sacrifice. In one treatment, V = 3, the group
 optimum does not always occur when every-
 one contributes. In particular, the group payoff
 is maximized when subjects contribute if and
 only if ri < 4V = 12. A subject who contrib-
 utes when ri - 12 < 0 sacrifices more than
 the entire group benefits. It is hard to imagine
 any circumstances in which such behavior can
 be rationalized, except, perhaps, if the warm-
 glow effects from contributing far outweigh
 private incentives. Surely such behavior can-
 not be rationalized for altruists, whose utility
 is a convex combination of group benefits and
 private benefits. The frequency of this type of
 contribution also provides, in a slightly differ-
 ent way, a lower bound on the amount of
 noise. Among inexperienced subjects, sacri-
 fice occurs with the same frequency as spite,
 but virtually disappears with experience (1 ob-
 servation out of 129).
 In summary, the kind of behavior that
 cannot be explained easily with simple models
 of warm glow or altruism occurs only rarely
 in our data, and mostly disappears with
 experience.
 ' There are possible rationalizations for splitting that
 we do not consider here. Kay-Yut Chen ( 1994) constructs
 a model in which subjects do not know the payoff they
 will get from their contribution decisions until they have
 made their choice. In that case, splitting serves a diversi-
 fication role. It may also be possible to rationalize splitting
 if the warm-glow (or altruism) effect is nonlinear in
 contributions.
 6 Splitting is heavily concentrated among a few sub-
 jects. Only three of the subjects account for 30 percent of
 all observations of splitting, and six of the subjects account
 for over half of such observations. At the other end of the
 scale, nearly 40 percent of the subjects either never split
 or split only one time (out of 40 chances).
 7 However, as we show, some of this may be attribut-
 able to a negative warm-glow effect in some individuals.
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 FIGURE 1. CUTPOINT ANALYSIS: FREQUENCY OF DEVIATIONS FROM THE g-OPTIMAL DECISION RULE
 Notes: For each hypothetical warm-glow effect, g, the graph shows the frequency of deviations from
 the g-optimal decision rule, q. The value g = 1 has the lowest associated q.
 B. A Simple Model
 For a first look at the data, consider the fol-
 lowing very simple model of behavior. As-
 sume that all subjects are identical and that
 they contribute if and only if the difference
 between their token value and the public good
 value is less than or equal to some critical
 value, or cutpoint, g, but that they randomly
 deviate from this decision rule some fraction
 of the time, q. Call g the warn-glow effect;
 e.g., if g > 0, then the interpretation is that a
 subject gains g solely from the act of contri-
 bution. Given a fixed value of g, a subject's
 g-optimal decision rule is:
 fcontribute if (r, - V) < g
 R= keep if(ri-V)> g
 keep or contribute if (ri - V) = g.
 Despite its simplicity, this class of (g, q)
 models encompasses a variety of behavior,
 from completely random decisions (q = 1) to
 the standard model of completely selfish be-
 havior with no error at all (g = 0, q = 0).
 From our data, we can estimate the maximum-
 likelihood values of (g, q) simply by finding
 that value of g for which the observed fre-
 quency of deviations from the g-optimal de-
 cision rule is minimized. Within this very
 simple class of models such a value of g best
 describes the data. Figure 1 graphs the ob-
 served frequency of deviation from the g-
 optimal decision rule, for each integer value of
 g in the range between -15 and 20. The best
 estimate is g = 1, at which the deviation rate
 is q = 0.11. The standard "selfish" model,
 g = 0, is nearly as good, with a deviation rate
 of q = 0. 12.8 The implication of this very sim-
 ple analysis is that an aggregate warm-glow
 effect exists, but it is small in magnitude.9
 There is overcontribution relative to the
 selfish theory, but much, if not all, of this
 overcontribution seems to be explainable as
 8 Even though the difference in the deviation rate is
 small, a likelihood ratio test rejects the g = 0 model in
 favor of the g = 1 model. The x2 statistic is 107.47 with
 1 degree of freedom and n = 2,560.
 9 The dollar equivalent of the difference between g =
 1 and g = 0 is one cent, in the sense that g = 1 corre-
 sponds, in experimental payoffs, to behavior in which a
 subject is willing to contribute his or her endowment if
 and only if the value of the endowment exceeds the value
 of the public good by no more than one cent.
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 noise rather than some systematic compo-
 nent of the decision rule. In the next sections,
 we examine the nature of the decision rule
 in detail, giving more consideration to the
 structure of errors generating deviations, to
 possible heterogeneity across individuals,
 and to the role of other factors such as ex-
 perience and altruism, that are likely to af-
 fect contribution decisions.
 C. The Probit Model
 The probit model provides a standard way
 to measure the probability of contribution as a
 function of the different treatment variables,
 such as the individually assigned token values,
 the public good value, and experience. The
 structural model underlying this analysis is the
 following. We assume that the utility player i
 gets in period t from contributing xit units of
 the private good is:
 Ui (xit, x-it)
 N
 =Vt X, + (gi - r1)xit + ri,wit
 j=1
 N
 + aei (N -l )Vt E, xit
 j=1
 + X r(g - rit)xit + rtwit]],
 j*i
 where
 Vt is the public good value in period t,
 gi is player i's warm-glow term,
 rit is player i's token value in period t,
 wit is player i's endowment of tokens in pe-
 riod t,
 ai is player i's altruism term, and
 N is number of players in i's group.
 Finally, in order to estimate the model we
 assume that for each of subject i's decisions
 at period t there is a random component, sit,
 that is added to the warm-glow term. This
 error term represents some random added
 propensity for the subject to either contribute
 or not contribute. We assume that the sit's
 are independent, identical, Normally distrib-
 uted random variables with mean zero and
 variance a2. A subject contributes if and
 only if
 si (rit - V,) - gi- ai(N -I)V,
 where the right-hand side contains all the el-
 ements of the subject's utility function that de-
 termine his or her choice xit.
 Accordingly, we estimate a probit model,
 where the probability of contributing a unit of
 the endowment is given by the cumulative
 Normal transformation of a linear function of
 the independent variables in the model. Given
 our specification of the decision rule of the
 subject, our independent variables are:
 * a constant term, which we call constant;
 * the difference (ri - V), which we call
 diff; and
 * the value of the public good, V.
 In addition, we include three other variables
 that were controlled in the experiment:
 * exper, for experience, which takes on a
 value of zero for decisions in the first ten-
 period sequence with a given public good
 value, and one for decisions in the second ten-
 period sequence of the same public good
 value;
 * endow, which takes on a value of zero if
 the endowment is indivisible and one if it is
 divisible; and
 * period, which takes on values from one
 to ten.
 D. The Representative Subject Model
 We present estimates from two probit mod-
 els which differ only in which independent
 variables are included. Note that in these rep-
 resentative subject models, the warm-glow
 and altruism effects are implicitly assumed to
 be the same across individuals. An observation
 is a contribution decision in a single period."?
 ' We pool observations across all experiments. Deci-
 sions in the divisible endowment treatment (endow = 1)
 are coded as either 0 or 1, depending on whether subjects
 contributed less than half or more than half their endow-
 ment of tokens in a given period, respectively. Similar
 conclusions obtain when the two endowment treatment
 samples are estimated separately. This is addressed in de-
 tail in the next section, where some minor differences are
 also discussed.
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 TABLE 3-ESTIMATES FROM PROBIT MODELS
 Probit models
 1 2 3
 diff -0.25 -0.17 -0.27
 (-27.63) (-8.12) (-9.60)
 exper.d -0.059 -0.077
 (-3.23) (-3.45)
 endow.d -0.034 0.017
 (- 1.9 1) (0.66)
 period.d -0.0079 -0.0096
 (-2.53) (-2.51)
 constant 0.55 0.52 See Figures
 (6.31) (3.94) 2 and 3
 exper 0.010 0.025
 (0.12) (0.26)
 endow -0.046
 (-0.55)
 V 0.0077 0.0089 -0.0020
 (0.90) (1.02) (-0.19)
 period 0.0070 0.0058
 (0.46) (0.34)
 log likelihood -810.23 -796.87 -588.92
 observations 2,560 2,560 2,560
 percent correctly 86.45 86.60 91.48
 predicted
 Notes: In each probit model the dependent variable is the binary
 investment decision variable. Under each coefficient is the asymp-
 totic t-statistic. Variables appended with .d are interactions with
 dif Probit models I and 2 assume identical fixed effects for all
 individuals (homogeneity). Probit model 3 estimates separate in-
 dividual fixed effects for each of the 64 subjects (heterogeneity).
 These individual effects are displayed in Figures 2 and 3.
 The first column of Table 3 reports the re-
 sults of estimating the probit equation includ-
 ing only the variables constant, diff, and V.
 Given the specification of the individual utility
 functions, the coefficient of constant is an es-
 timate of the warm-glow effect divided by the
 standard deviation of the error term, or g/a.
 The coefficients of diff and V are estimates of
 -1/a and a(N -1)/o. Thus, through alge-
 braic manipulation, we can directly obtain an
 estimate of the warm-glow effect, g, and the
 altruism effect, a.
 The results are clear. Both estimates have
 the predicted positive sign, but the coefficient
 of V is so small that the altruism parameter is
 not significantly different from zero. The co-
 efficients of constant and diff are both highly
 significant, indicating a significantly positive
 warm-glow effect with g approximately equal
 to 2.21.1"
 The estimate of the warm-glow term can be
 interpreted in the following way. Define a cut-
 point as the difference between the token value
 of a subject and the public good value at which
 our prediction of subject behavior switches
 from noncontribution to contribution, given
 specific values of the other independent vari-
 ables in the model.'2 Such a computation gives
 a cutpoint of approximately 2.5 token value
 units if V = 10. In other words, on average,
 with all other variables held fixed at these lev-
 els, subjects can be expected to contribute half
 their endowment when diff = -2.5.
 It is instructive to contrast this estimate to
 the one in the previous section, based on the
 very simple, two-parameter (g, q) model.
 With that model the probability of contribution
 is 1 - q if dif > g and equals q if dif< g.
 Since the cutpoints estimated under the two
 models differ, i.e., 1 for the (g, q) model ver-
 sus 2.5 for the probit model, an obvious ques-
 tion is: which model is better?
 This is also a question that is relevant to
 other recent efforts to estimate models of sub-
 ject decision errors in experiments. One class
 of models that has been explored is of the (g,
 q) variety. These are called constant error
 models because the probability of a decision
 error is assumed to be independent of other
 variables in the model.'3 Another class of
 models, one that includes the probit model, as-
 sumes that decision errors occur more fre-
 quently when subjects are nearly indifferent
 between choices.14
 " In fact, the t-statistic for g depends on the variances
 of both the coefficients constant and diff, and the t-statistic
 for a depends on the variances of both the coefficients diff
 and pval. These can be obtained using Taylor series ap-
 proximations as explained in Jan Kmenta ( 1971 p. 444).
 The resulting t-statistic for g is 5.6010, and the t-statistic
 for a is 0.9097.
 12 That is, the estimated cutpoint will depend on V in
 this model.
 13 See, for example, Richard D. McKelvey and Palfrey
 (1992), Richard T. Boylan and Mahmoud A. El-Gamal
 (1993), and David W. Harless and Colin F. Camerer
 (1994).
 14 For example, quantal response equilibrium as defined
 by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). Notice that the probit
 model we propose to explain the data is formally equiv-
 alent to a probit response specification of quantal response
 equilibrium.
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 Here we see that the estimated warm-glow
 term is more than twice as large in magnitude
 in the probit model compared with the con-
 stant error (g, q) model. Which estimate is
 better? There are several ways to conduct such
 a test, and in all those that we tried, a likeli-
 hood ratio test shows the probit model to be
 the clear winner, at highly significant levels.
 For example, we conducted a likelihood ratio
 test between the probit model including only
 the constant and diff variables and the (g, q)
 model with g = 1 and q = 0.105. To give the
 (g, q) model the benefit of the doubt, we as-
 sign the likelihood of contribution at the cut-
 point (diff = 1) to simply equal the empirical
 frequency. The likelihood ratio is equal to
 93.36. Since the two models are strictly non-
 nested, we use the Quang H. Vuong (1989)
 adjustment (rather than a standard chi-square
 test) to conduct a formal statistical test. This
 produces a z-statistic of 7.30 (significant at
 p < 10-12).
 We next run a probit including the addi-
 tional control variables exper, endow, and pe-
 riod, and also including the interaction of
 these variables with diff'5 (See column 2 of
 Table 3.) The interaction coefficients measure
 the effect of the variables on the coefficient of
 diff, with a negative coefficient indicating that
 the variance of the random utility term is get-
 ting smaller. Behaviorally, this lower variance
 translates into more predictable behavior by
 subjects, or steeper probit response curves.
 Not surprisingly, the interaction coefficients
 for both the experience variable and the period
 variable show such an effect, indicating that
 subject behavior is becoming more predictable
 over time. Also of interest is the fact that none
 of the noninteraction coefficients are signifi-
 cant. Jointly, this implies that the overall effect
 of experience and repetition is to reduce ag-
 gregate contributions, but that this reduction
 effect is indirect and due to the combination
 of reduced variance and the fact that the
 warm-glow level is positive. The estimated
 difference between cutpoints for inexperi-
 enced subjects in round one and experienced
 subjects in round ten is quite large, with the
 estimated warm-glow term dropping by nearly
 50 percent from 2.7 to 1.6. This suggests that
 subject confusion may indeed account for a
 large portion of the contributions by inexpe-
 rienced subjects.'6
 The bottom lines from the aggregate probit
 analysis are: (1) there is strong evidence for a
 warm-glow effect leading to voluntary contri-
 bution, and (2) there is no significant evidence
 for an altruism effect. The results also show
 that much of the decline in contribution from
 experience and repetition is due to decline in
 error rates rather than a change in the under-
 lying decision rule. As such, the decline in er-
 ror rates is a possible explanation for the decay
 effects observed in some past experiments, an
 explanation that avoids any recourse to models
 of reputation building or repeated games.'7
 E. The Heterogeneous Subjects Model
 The analysis in the previous section assumes
 that individuals are identical. In fact, there are
 indications of heterogeneity in our data. Sim-
 ilar indications have also been noted in many
 other economics and decision experiments
 (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992; El-Gamal and
 David M. Grether, 1995) and in public goods
 experiments (Isaac et al., 1984).
 Here, the aggregate analysis of the previ-
 ous section is broken down at the individual
 level by including a dummy variable for each
 individual, from which we can estimate the
 actual distribution of individual warm-glow
 effects.'8 The last column of Table 3 reports
 the coefficients for the included variables,
 '5 Interactions with V are not included because the ef-
 fect of V is insignificant.
 16 The coefficient on the endow treatment variable is
 insignificant and the coefficient on the interaction between
 endow and diff is very small (<.01 ) and barely significant
 at the 5-percent level. In the later analysis with individual
 effects, this small effect vanishes.
 " This also provides a possible explanation for
 Andreoni's ( 1988) finding that in a random matching de-
 sign, there is less decay than in the standard repeated-
 group design. This could happen if subject learning occurs
 more slowly in the random matching design, which is
 plausible since the random matching protocol introduces
 another source of noise in the feedback received by sub-
 jects after each period of play. See Palfrey and Prisbrey
 (1996) for additional evidence for this explanation.
 18 There are other conceivable sources of heterogeneity
 in these experiments, including cohort effects, nonlinear
 warm-glow terms, different varieties of altruistic prefer-
 ences, or differential error rates across subjects, but an
 exploration of multidimensional heterogeneity is well
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 FIGURE 2. INDIVIDUAL WARM-GLOW EFFECTS: PERIOD 1, INEXPERIENCED
 Note: The estimated individual warm-glow effects, gi, for our 64 subjects (inexperienced/period 1).
 excluding the coefficients for the 64 individ-
 ual warm-glow effects. A likelihood ratio test
 shows clearly that the individual effects are
 statistically significant at any reasonable level
 of significance. The x2 statistic is 415.9 with
 63 degrees of freedom. Thus, we reject the
 representative subject model in favor of the
 heterogeneous subject model. The informa-
 tion from the individual coefficients is sum-
 marized in Figures 2 and 3, which graph gi
 with 95-percent confidence intervals, for in-
 experienced and experienced subjects, re-
 spectively. Each individual cutpoint is
 calculated from the probit coefficients, in a
 manner similar to the computation of the ag-
 gregate cutpoint in the previous section.'9 The
 median warm-glow effect is 2.3 for inexpe-
 rienced subjects in period one and 1.4 for ex-
 perienced subjects in period ten, which is
 very close to the aggregate results of the pre-
 vious section. Considerably less than half the
 subjects have a warm-glow term that is sig-
 nificantly greater than zero. No subject has
 one that is significantly negative.
 The distribution of cutpoints in the experi-
 enced, period-ten treatment is clearly less dis-
 persed and has a lower median than the
 inexperienced distribution, which simply re-
 flects the significant effect of those variables
 on reducing error rates, as discussed earlier.
 The decisions are moving in the direction of
 the predictions of the selfish model, where the
 warm-glow effect is zero. The confidence in-
 terval around each individual cutpoint is big-
 ger because of the compounded effect of the
 variance of period.d.
 The endow variable was excluded because
 otherwise the model is not identified, i.e., en-
 dow, pval, and the individual dummies are
 collinear. To test for any effects due to the
 endowment, we separately estimate model 3
 for the two subsamples defined by the endow =
 O (binary endowment) and endow = 1 (di-
 visible endowment) treatments. The results
 are reported in Table 4, and the estimated in-
 beyond the scope of this paper. For example, simple clas-
 sification analysis in Palfrey and Prisbrey (1993) suggests
 the possibility of differential error rates, which we have
 chosen not to model explicitly here. Nevertheless, we are
 confident that our specification captures the key compo-
 nent of subject heterogeneity in these experiments. As
 with any estimation, our results are subject to the usual
 caveat about other additional (unmeasured) sources of
 heterogeneity.
 '9 The confidence intervals were derived using an es-
 timate of the variance of gi. The estimate was created us-
 ing a Taylor series approximation as described in Kmenta
 (1971 p. 444).
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 FIGURE 3. INDIVIDUAL WARM-GLOW EFFECTS: PERIOD 10, EXPERIENCED
 Note: The estimated individual wann-glow effects, gi, for our 64 subjects (experienced/period 10).
 dividual warm-glow terms are reported in
 Figure 4.2
 The first column of Table 4 is the same as
 the last column of Table 3. The second column
 gives the parameter estimates for the binary
 endowment treatment, and the last column
 gives the parameter estimates for the divisible
 endowment treatment. The similarities and
 differences are as follows.
 First, the three key findings of this hetero-
 geneous probit analysis are the same in the two
 separate samples: (a) diff is highly significant
 in both treatments, and of the same order of
 magnitude-hence warm glow is significant
 and of the same importance in both samples;
 (b) V is not significant in either treatment,
 hence altruism is insignificant in both samples;
 and (c) the implied distribution of individual
 warm-glow terms is the same as it was in the
 pooled estimation.2' These similarities are not
 surprising, given the low splitting rates ob-
 served in the experiment, and the concentra-
 tion of these splitting rates in a small
 subsample of the population.
 There is one difference between the sepa-
 rately estimated models, one which is of rel-
 atively minor consequence. The interaction
 term between diff and exper is significant for
 the divisible token sample, but not for the
 other sample. The coefficient is also larger in
 magnitude. This suggests that error rates in the
 divisible endowment condition may start
 slightly higher and decline faster with experi-
 ence. We speculate that this is either due to
 natural sample variation (recall that there are
 only 32 subjects in each treatment), or indic-
 ative of a small treatment effect. The subjects
 in the divisible endowment treatment have
 more choices (ten instead of two) and receive
 finer feedback. The additional choices may be
 more confusing initially, while the feedback
 may enable subjects to gain experience faster.
 20 The individual warm-glow terms are evaluated at the
 means of the other independent variables.
 21 A Kolmogoroff-Smirnoff test on the equality of the
 two distributions of individual warm-glow terms, one ob-
 tained from the pooled sample and the other from separate
 estimations based on the endowment, indicates that the
 distributions are not statistically different. The test statistic
 is 0.0625. The critical value for a = 0.05 is approximately
 0.2404. We also estimated the endow = 1 data using an
 ordered probit model, and found no significant differences
 between those estimates and the estimates in Table 4 and
 Figure 4.
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 TABLE 4--HETEROGENEOUS PROBIT
 SUBSAMPLE ESTIMATES
 Binary Divisible
 Pooled only only
 diff -0.27 -0.31 -0.23
 (-9.60) (-8.47) (-7.24)
 exper.d -0.077 0.003 -0.22
 (-3.45) (0. 10) (-5.13)
 endow.d 0.017
 (0.66)
 period.d -0.0096 .0077 -0.011
 (-2.51) (-1.43) (-2.06)
 constant See Figure 4
 exper 0.025 -0.059 0.12
 (0.26) (-0.42) (0.85)
 V -0.0020 0.015 -0.015
 (-0.19) (0.95) (-1.06)
 period 0.0058 0.015 -0.0089
 (0.34) (0.60) (-0.37)
 log likelihood -588.92 -287.24 -288.63
 observations 2,560 1,280 1,280
 percent correctly 91.48 91.72 91.17
 predicted
 Notes: In each probit model the dependent variable is the binary
 investment decision variable. The column two estimates are com-
 puted using data from the treatment where subjects were endowed
 with one token. The last column uses data where subjects were
 endowed with nine tokens. Under each coefficient is the asymptotic
 t-statistic. Variables appended with .d are interactions with diff. The
 individual fixed effects for each of the 64 subjects (heterogeneity)
 are displayed in Figure 4.
 The significant coefficient may also reflect the
 fact that splitting declines sharply with
 experience.
 F. The Effect of Noise
 The individual analysis described above
 also allows a comparison of the relative im-
 portance of noise to the warm-glow and altru-
 ism effects on the subject's ultimate decision.
 Past experimental designs have been unable to
 differentiate these effects. In past designs, sub-
 jects were only observed making decisions
 when they had a dominant incentive to keep.
 Any error that was made was necessarily a
 contribution, and the experimenter had no way
 to differentiate the noise from contributions
 due to a warm glow or altruism. Our design
 and the properties of the probit model give us
 a way to control for and measure the magni-
 tude of the noise.
 Take our estimated distribution of individ-
 ual cutpoints, from the pooled estimation, as
 fixed. Then, from this calculate a predicted fre-
 quency of contribution if subjects were as-
 sumed never to make errors relative to their
 cutpoint. For example, subjects with a cutpoint
 of four are predicted to contribute their entire
 endowment if and only if ri - V ? 4. Since
 the estimated distribution of cutpoints varies
 across periods and experience level, we can
 generate profiles of aggregate contribution
 rates as a function of diff for each period and
 each experience level. The no-noise curves in
 Figures 5 and 6 display these profiles for the
 two polar extremes, respectively, period onel
 inexperienced and period tenl experienced.
 Other profiles, which include the effect of er-
 rors on the frequency of contribution, can be
 computed directly from the probit scores of
 each individual at each value of diff. The noise
 curves in Figures 5 and 6 display these profiles
 for identical extremes.
 The difference between the no-noise and
 noise curves represents the amount of contri-
 bution that is attributable to noise, for each
 different value of diff. In particular it vividly
 illustrates the measurement problem inherent
 in experiments where all subjects are given the
 same positive values of diff. For example, for
 diff = 5, we estimate that more than half the
 observed contributions of experienced sub-
 jects are due to random variation. Of course,
 a reverse effect occurs at values of diff below
 the average cutpoint (consistent with the ob-
 servations of Saijo and Nakamura, 1995).
 However, according to our estimates, this re-
 verse effect seems to be small in magnitude,
 since most warm-glow fixed effects are
 positive.
 It is also possible to apply these measure-
 ments to past experiments that used a fixed
 value of ri for all subjects and for all contri-
 bution rounds. For example, Isaac et al.
 (1984) conducted several experiments in
 which all subjects' marginal rate of substitu-
 tion between the public good and the private
 good, riIV, equaled 3.33. Because of differ-
 ences in subject pools, payoff magnitudes, and
 other design factors, the translation of this
 marginal rate of substitution into our diff pa-
 rameter in our experiment is admittedly very
 rough. With this caveat in mind, r, IV = 3.33
 corresponds to V = 3, ri = 10, or V = 6,
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 FIGURE 4. INDIVIDUAL WARM-GLow EFFECTS: POOLED VS. SEPARATE
 Note: The estimated individual warm-glow effects from the separate estimations by endowment
 condition (Table 4 columns 2 and 3) compared to the pooled estimates (Table 4 column 1).-
 ri = 20, which yields a wide range of predic-
 tions, depending which one is used. Using our
 measurements, the range of predicted contri-
 bution lies between 4 percent and 20 percent
 for inexperienced subjects, well over half of
 which is attributable to error. Predictions for
 experienced subjects lie in the range of 10 per-
 cent or less.
 This estimated contribution rate is some-
 what less than than was observed by Isaac et
 al., at least for inexperienced subjects. We did,
 however, successfully replicate the Isaac et al.
 results in an additional experiment using our
 protocol and a fixed ri across subjects.22 This
 suggests that some of the overcontribution in
 past experiments may be due to the use of a
 degenerate distribution of private values.23
 Andreoni (1988) conducted experiments sim-
 ilar to those of Isaac et al. (1984), but with
 five-person groups and ri /V = 2. Comparisons
 of our data to his lead to similar conclusions.
 These results can also be compared to recent
 findings by Andreoni (1995) in an experiment
 which was also motivated by the problem of
 differentiating errors. His design consisted of
 two treatments: one where subjects were paid
 what they earned in the experiment, and an-
 other where subjects were paid by a fixed for-
 mula based on the rank of their payoff. The
 latter treatment is assumed to remove much of
 the altruistic incentive for contribution.24
 Otherwise, the experiment is run in the usual
 22 This is not included in the present paper for reasons
 of space. See Palfrey and Prisbrey ( 1993) for details. That
 paper also presented results from a treatment in which
 subjects were informed of their fellow group members'
 token values, which was conducted to test whether the
 incomplete information in the present experiment was re-
 sponsible for the slightly lower contribution rates. The
 finding was that this additional information did not in-
 crease contribution rates, rejecting the hypothesis that in-
 complete information leads to more free-riding.
 23 One theoretical explanation for this difference
 would be that warm-glow effects are subject to dimin-
 ishing returns and that these effects are cumulative over
 the course of the experiment. In the nondegenerate de-
 sign, subjects nearly always contribute when they have
 low values of ri, so diminishing warm-glow effects
 would lead to less contribution than in the degenerate
 designs where ri is always greater than V. This suggests
 possible future experiments.
 24 It is not entirely clear why rank payoffs should nec-
 essarily remove the warm-glow incentive for contribution.
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 FIGURE 5. EXPECTED SPENDING: PERIOD 1, INEXPERIENCED
 Notes: The noise curve assumes subjects make errors as in probit model 3. The no-noise curve assumes the subjects make
 no errors. The curves here represent an inexperienced population in period 1.
 fashion, with homogeneous valuations. He
 finds that if one attributes all of the contribu-
 tion in the rank treatment to confusion (what
 we call noise) this accounts for approximately
 one-third of the total contribution in the reg-
 ular treatment.
 III. Conclusion
 We have designed and carried out an ex-
 periment that differs from past public goods
 experiments in that the marginal value of the
 private good differs across subjects, and also
 across periods for the same subject. As a re-
 sult, individual response functions could be,
 and were, estimated. That is, we estimated the
 probability that a particular individual will
 contribute given his or her value for the private
 good and the common value for the public
 good.
 In turn, the relative importance of altruism
 effects, warm-glow effects, and subject error
 were determined. We found that altruism
 played little or no role at all in the individual's
 decision and, on the other hand, warm-glow
 effects and random error played both impor-
 tant and significant roles. We further measured
 heterogeneity in the warm-glow effect across
 subjects and found that they fell in a fairly
 wide range of predominantly nonnegative
 values.
 As in past experiments, we found that ex-
 perience is a significant explanatory variable
 and leads to declining contribution rates. This
 decline was shown to be the result mainly of
 a reduction in the amount of subject decision
 error combined with a lower variance in the
 distribution of individual warm-glow effects.
 It is not due to an overall decline in warm
 glow. Players do not become significantly
 more selfish with experience; rather, their
 preferences as we measure them are relatively
 stable with respect to experience. Overall,
 most of the raw data from our experiments
 corroborate past findings but we offer a much
 different explanation for these data. The con-
 sistent observations include the significance of
 decay and experience, and the generally very
 strong responsiveness of contribution rates to
 the opportunity cost of contribution. There are
 some differences in magnitude, which we
 view as minor. The fact that data from past
 experiments exhibit even higher contribution
 rates than we observed may be due to the fixed
 nature of the subjects' valuations in those
 experiments.
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 FIGURE 6. EXPECTED SPENDING: PERIOD 10, EXPERIENCED
 Notes: The noise curve assumes subjects make errors as in probit model 3. The no-noise curve assumes the subjects make
 no errors. The curves here represent an experienced population in period 10.
 While more research obviously remains to
 be done before we have a complete picture of
 the incentives and motivations for individuals
 to contribute to public goods, quite a bit has
 been learned here, particularly about the role
 of nonmonetary components of the utility
 function and the role of subject decision errors.
 Besides this, the methodological lesson from
 this experiment should be clear. It is indeed
 possible to design experiments where the de-
 tails of individual decision rules can be accu-
 rately measured. And, furthermore, these
 measurements can be used to distinguish be-
 tween different theoretical explanations for in-
 teresting systematic features in the aggregate
 data. Given the considerable amount of het-
 erogeneity of behavior across subjects that is
 known to be characteristic of these experi-
 ments, improved measurement at the individ-
 ual level would seem to be a necessary
 ingredient to reaching a better understanding
 of these phenomena.
 APPENDIX
 Sample Instructions from 4/9/92 (read aloud)
 This is an experiment in decision-making.
 You will be paid IN CASH at the end of the
 experiment. The amount of money you earn
 will depend upon the decisions you make and
 on the decisions other people make. It is im-
 portant that you do not talk at all or otherwise
 attempt to communicate with the other sub-
 jects except according to the specific rules of
 the experiment. If you have a question, feel
 free to raise your hand. One of us will come
 over to where you are sitting and answer your
 question in private.
 This session you are participating in is bro-
 ken down into a sequence of four separate ex-
 periments. Each experiment will last ten
 rounds. At the end of the last experiment, you
 will be paid the total amount you have accu-
 mulated during the course of all four experi-
 ments. Everyone will be paid in private and
 you are under no obligation to tell others how
 much you earned. Your earnings are given in
 FRANCS. At the end of the last experiment,
 you will be paid 11 cents for every 100
 FRANCS you have accumulated during the
 course of all four experiments.
 In each experiment you will be divided into
 four groups of four persons each. Those
 groups will stay the same for all ten rounds
 of the experiment. After each ten-round
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 experiment, everyone will be regrouped into
 four entirely new groups. Therefore, when-
 ever we change groups, the other people in
 your group will be completely different from
 the last group you were in. You will not be
 told the identity of the other members in your
 group. Since we will be running four exper-
 iments tonight, you will be assigned four dif-
 ferent groupings, one for each ten-round
 experiment.
 Rules for Experiment 1
 Each round of the experiment you will have
 nine tokens. You must choose how many of
 these tokens you wish to keep and how many
 tokens you wish to spend. The amount of
 money you earn in a round depends on how
 many tokens you keep, how many tokens you
 spend, and how many tokens are spent by oth-
 ers in your group. Each round, you will be told
 how many FRANCS each token is worth if
 you keep it. This amount, called your TOKEN
 VALUE, and will change from round to round
 and will vary from person to person randomly.
 To be more specific, in each round, this
 amount is equally likely to be anywhere from
 1 to 20 FRANCS. There is absolutely no sys-
 tematic or intentional pattern to your token
 values or the token values of anyone else. The
 determination of token values across rounds
 and across people is entirely random. There-
 fore, everyone in your group will generally
 have different token values. Furthermore,
 these token values will change from round to
 round in a random way. You will be informed
 PRIVATELY what your new token value is at
 the beginning of each round and you are not
 permitted to tell anyone what this amount is.
 After being told your token value, you must
 wait at least ten seconds before making your
 decision of how many tokens to spend and
 how many to keep. Your keyboard will be fro-
 zen for this period of time. When everyone has
 made a decision, you are told how many to-
 kens were spent in your group and what your
 earnings were for that round.
 This will continue for ten rounds. Following
 each round you will begin with nine new to-
 kens and you will be randomly assigned a new
 token value between 1 and 20 FRANCS.
 PAYOFFS
 You will receive 3 FRANCS times the total
 number of tokens spent in your group. In ad-
 dition, you will also receive your token value
 times the number of tokens you keep. Notice
 that this means every time anyone in your
 group spends a token, everyone in the group
 (including the spender) gets an additional 3
 FRANCS, but the spender forgoes his or her
 token value for that token. WHAT HAPPENS
 IN YOUR GROUP HAS NO EFFECT ON
 THE PAYOFFS TO MEMBERS OF THE
 OTHER GROUPS AND VICE VERSA.
 Therefore, in each round, you have the fol-
 lowing possible earnings, as shown in the
 table:
 [WRITE EARNINGS TABLE ON BOARD AND EXPLAIN HOW TO READ IT]
 EARNINGS TABLE FOR EXPERIMENT 1
 Your spending decision Others Your earnings (in FRANCS)
 0 N tokens (N*3) + (9*your token value)
 1 N tokens 3 + (N*3) + (8*your token value)
 2 N tokens 6 + (N*3) + (7*your token value)
 3 N tokens 9 + (N*3) + (6*your token value)
 4 N tokens 12 + (N*3) + (5*your token value)
 5 N tokens 15 + (N*3) + (4*your token value)
 6 N tokens 18 + (N*3) + (3*your token value)
 7 N tokens 21 + (N*3) + (2*your token value)
 8 N tokens 24 + (N*3) + your token value
 9 N tokens 27 + (N*3)
 Here is an example:
 Suppose everyone else in your group spends
 13 tokens in all and you spend four tokens and
 your token value was 12. You would earn
 12 + 39 + 60 = 111 FRANCS. If you had
 spent three tokens you would have earned 9 +
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 39 + 72 = 120 FRANCS. If you had spent
 five tokens you would have earned 15 + 39 +
 48 = 102 FRANCS.
 ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES:
 Are there any questions? [ANSWER
 QUESTIONS]
 [Two practice rounds. Tell them not to press
 any keys unless you tell them to. In round 1
 have each subject spend the number of tokens
 equal to the last digit of his or her ID#. In
 round 2 have each subject KEEP the number
 of tokens equal to the last digit of his or her
 ID#. Go over screen display and history dis-
 play. Tell subjects to refrain from pressing
 keys for no reason.]
 [Keep screen display on.]
 [Hand out quiz.]
 [Correct quiz answers and read correct an-
 swers aloud.]
 [Answer any additional questions.]
 [Begin experiment 1.]
 Specific instructions for experiment 2:
 Experiment 2 is the same as experiment 1
 except you now have been regrouped with a
 completely different set of participants.
 [Begin experiment 2.]
 Specific instructions for experiment 3:
 Experiment 3 is the same as experiments 1
 and 2, except now everyone in a group re-
 ceives 15 FRANCS times the number of
 spenders in his or her group. Again, in addi-
 tion, nonspenders also receive their token val-
 ues. Again, everyone has been reassigned to a
 new group with a new set of participants. Here
 is your new payoff table.
 [CHANGE BOARD; EXPLAIN]
 EARNINGS TABLE FOR EXPERIMENT 3
 Your spending decision Others Your earnings (in FRANCS)
 0 N tokens (N*15) + (9*your token value)
 1 N tokens 15 + (N*15) + (8*your token value)
 2 N tokens 30 + (N*15) + (7*your token value)
 3 N tokens 45 + (N* 15) + (6*your token value)
 4 N tokens 60 + (N* 15) + (5*your token value)
 5 N tokens 75 + (N*15) + (4*your token value)
 6 N tokens 90 + (N* 15) + (3*your token value)
 7 N tokens 105 + (N* 15) + (2*your token value)
 8 N tokens 120 + (N* 15) + your token value
 9 N tokens 135 + (N*15)
 Example:
 Suppose everyone else in your group spends
 13 tokens in all and you spend four tokens
 and your token value was 12. You would earn
 60 + 195 + 60 = 315 FRANCS. If you had
 spent three tokens you would have earned 45 +
 195 + 72 = 312 FRANCS. If you had spent
 five tokens you would have earned 75 +
 195 + 48 = 318 FRANCS.
 [Begin experiment 3.]
 Specific instructions for experiment 4:
 Experiment 4 is the same as experiment 3,
 except you have been regrouped again.
 [Begin experiment 4.]
 [Pay subjects in private in separate room and
 dismiss them one at a time.]
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